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Abstract
& The ventral visual pathway implements object recognition
and categorization in a hierarchy of processing areas with
neuronal selectivities of increasing complexity. The presence
of massive feedback connections within this hierarchy raises
the possibility that normal visual processing relies on the use
of computational loops. It is not known, however, whether
object recognition can be performed at all without such loops
(i.e., in a purely feed-forward mode). By analyzing the time
course of reaction times in a masked natural scene
categorization paradigm, we show that the human visual
system can generate selective motor responses based on a
single feed-forward pass. We confirm these results using a
more constrained letter discrimination task, in which the
rapid succession of a target and mask is actually perceived as
a distractor. We show that a masked stimulus presented for
only 26 msec—and often not consciously perceived—can fully
determine the earliest selective motor responses: The neural
representations of the stimulus and mask are thus kept
separated during a short period corresponding to the feed-
forward ‘‘sweep.’’ Therefore, feedback loops do not appear to
be ‘‘mandatory’’ for visual processing. Rather, we found that
such loops allow the masked stimulus to reverberate in the
visual system and affect behavior for nearly 150 msec after the
feed-forward sweep. &
INTRODUCTION
Over the past 40 years it has been established that the
numerous cortical areas that constitute the primate
visual system follow a hierarchical organization (Felle-
man & Van Essen, 1991; Barlow, 1972; Hubel & Wiesel,
1962). Many theoretical and computational models of
visual processing in the ventral pathway suggest that
object recognition can be performed in a single feed-
forward pass throughout such a hierarchy (e.g., Riesen-
huber & Poggio, 1999; VanRullen, Gautrais, Delorme, &
Thorpe, 1998; Wallis & Rolls, 1997; Fukushima & Miyake,
1982). Yet our visual systems contain extensive feedback
connections that certainly play an important role in
visual perception (Bullier, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema,
2000; Lamme, Super, & Spekreijse, 1998). Indeed, many
models and algorithms for visual processing explicitly
require some form of feedback or iterative loops to
achieve contour integration (Li, 1998; Shashua & Ull-
man, 1988; Grossberg & Mingolla, 1985a), texture or
figure–ground segregation (Bullier, Huppe, James, &
Girard, 2001; Gove, Grossberg, & Mingolla, 1995;
Heitger & von der Heydt, 1993; Grossberg & Mingolla,
1985b), object recognition (Ullman, 1989, 1995; Gross-
berg & Mingolla, 1985a), or visual attention (Kirkland &
Gerstein, 1999; Tsotsos et al., 1995; Koch & Ullman,
1985). In order to assess the plausibility of the different
classes of models, it is thus critical to establish in
humans the extent and the type of computational loops
participating in a given visual task: In particular, are
these loops necessary, or can the task be performed at
all in a feed-forward mode?
In practice, the presence of ‘‘mandatory’’ computa-
tional loops implies that if two stimuli are presented in
close temporal succession (i.e., if the stimulus-onset
asynchrony is less than the time it takes for information
to travel along the feedback loops), the representation
of the first stimulus will be interrupted by (or overlap
with) the representation of the second before the
system’s response is generated. This phenomenon can
thus explain ‘‘backward masking’’ effects (i.e., failures
of the visual system to perceive a stimulus that is
followed too closely in time by another one; Lamme &
Roelfsema, 2000; Breitmeyer, 1984; Kahneman, 1968).
Under such conditions, the masked stimulus (perceived
or not) is nevertheless able to trigger selective neuronal
responses, albeit brief and relatively weak, throughout
the ventral pathway and up to areas of the inferotem-
poral cortex (Keysers, Xiao, Foldiak, & Perrett, 2001;
Kovacs, Vogels, & Orban, 1995; Rolls & Tovee, 1994), and
can even influence behavior (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998,
2001; Keysers et al., 2001; Neumann & Klotz, 1994). Yet
these observations do not necessarily imply that visual
processing is ‘‘feed-forward.’’ Indeed, such responses
could also result from a situation in which feedback
loops do not fully erase the representation of theCalifornia Institute of Technology
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stimulus, but let it overlap with that of the mask. To
prove that a system can perform in a feed-forward mode,
one needs to analyze not only the type but also the time
course of the system’s output as a function of the time
course of its inputs; one needs to show that the repre-
sentations of the stimulus and mask do not overlap (i.e.,
that a masked stimulus can trigger behavioral responses
that are indistinguishable—at least for a short period—
from responses to the same unmasked stimulus).
We set out to address this question using a complex
natural scene categorization task, where subjects must
decide as quickly as possible whether a color photo-
graph flashed for only 26 msec contains an animal. It has
been previously reported, using unmasked stimulus
presentation, that visual evoked potentials in this task
can reflect the subject’s decision as early as 150 msec
after stimulus onset ( VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001a;
Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996). This makes such a task
a particularly good candidate for a feed-forward process-
ing implementation (see also Thorpe & Fabre-Thorpe,
2001; Thorpe & Imbert, 1989).
RESULTS
We adopt a functional (rather than anatomical) defini-
tion of a computational loop: A neuron participates in
such a loop if at some point in time it receives signals
that depend on the results of its own previous compu-
tations (VanRullen, Delorme, & Thorpe, 2001; Treves,
Rolls, & Tovee, 1996); the loop can be said to be
‘‘mandatory’’ if the performance of the system is con-
tingent upon this neuron receiving these signals. Note
that we make no assumption here as to the direction
of such signals in the anatomical hierarchy of the
ventral visual stream (Nowak & Bullier, 1998): A lower
level neuron (say, a V1 neuron) receiving signals from a
higher level area (say, V4) that are not related to this
neuron’s previous computations will not be said to
participate in a computational loop. Note also that this
definition of feedback excludes any type of top-down
‘‘preparatory’’ signal that could take place prior to
stimulus presentation. Although there is no doubt that
such signals might be critical to the observed perform-
ance, the present paradigm is unfortunately not appro-
priate for addressing this issue.
Our approach (illustrated in Figure 1) is to analyze the
distribution of reaction times (RTs) for a particular task
(using both masked and unmasked stimulus presenta-
tion), and consider two critical questions. First, the
duration for which the mask can overwrite the responses
to the stimulus ‘‘backward’’ in time (relative to the
duration expected in a feed-forward model) indicates
the extent and duration of ‘‘mandatory’’ loops (i.e., for
how long stimulus information must ‘‘loop’’ before a
reliable response can be generated; Figure 1A). Second,
the duration for which the stimulus will continue to
affect responses ‘‘forward’’ in time, even after the mask
has been presented, indicates how the representation
of the stimulus ‘‘reverberates’’ in the system (i.e., for
how long it can enter and reenter feedback loops
before it fades away or before it is fully erased by the
mask; Figure 1B).
Figure 1. Processing loops in the visual system. The system’s
response to a succession of two stimuli (s1 and s2, separated in time
by SOA, as shown on the left) can indicate the nature and extent
of feedback loops in visual processing. In a purely feed-forward
architecture with continuous inputs, the response of the system will
reflect the first stimulus s1 for a duration of exactly ‘‘SOA,’’ then switch
to reflect stimulus s2. The system’s output will directly correspond
to its input, translated in time by a certain delay minRT (this delay
represents the minimum time at which the system is able to generate
selective responses). (A) The expected duration of the normal
behavioral response r1 to stimulus s1 is decreased by ‘‘mandatory’’
loops. In some systems, some form of agreement between feedback
signals and the current input is required before information can be
transmitted to a subsequent stage, or before a particular function can
be realized (e.g., contour integration, object recognition). We refer to
the minimal time during which such an agreement is necessary for
processing to resume (including the time spent within the loop) as the
time minloop. If the information conveyed by a processing unit is
replaced by a second stimulus before the feedback signal is received
(formally, if SOA < minloop), no agreement can be found and the
processing of the first stimulus is terminated. This property is often
used to explain backward masking effects. In the more general case
(as shown in A), the duration of the system’s normal response to
the first stimulus (r1) will be shortened by this time minloop compared
to the expected response duration in a purely feed-forward system
(equal to SOA). (B) ‘‘Reverberation’’ of stimulus s1 can affect normal
behavioral response r2 to stimulus s2. A computational loop can imply
that after a processing unit has transmitted its output and allowed the
system to continue processing of stimulus s1, it will keep receiving
(through feedback connections) signals carrying information about
that stimulus for a certain period. We refer to the maximal time during
which information regarding a particular stimulus can ‘‘reverberate’’ in
the system (i.e., for how long it can enter and reenter the loop before it
fades away or before it is erased by a subsequent stimulation) as the
time maxloop. In practice (as shown in B), the system’s response will
continue to reflect stimulus s1 for a duration ‘‘maxloop’’ longer than the
duration expected in a purely feed-forward system (i.e., SOA). A purely
feed-forward system will thus be defined as: minloop = maxloop = 0.
When minloop > 0, the system contains ‘‘mandatory’’ loops (or a
minimal integration period) and thus requires a minimum time of
input consistency to generate reliable responses. Finally, a feed-
forward system (minloop = 0) with reverberatory activity (maxloop > 0)
is also a conceivable alternative.
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Categorization of Masked Natural Scenes
Subjects were presented for 26 msec with color photo-
graphs of natural scenes, half of which contained one or
more animals. These included not only mammals but
also fish, birds, or reptiles and could appear at any size
or location within the picture. In each condition, one-
third of the images were immediately masked (stimulus
onset asynchrony [SOA] 26 msec) by a strong contrast
mixture of white noise at different spatial frequencies, on
which a naturalistic colored texture was superimposed
(Figure 2A). The subjects were asked to respond as fast as
possible when the stimulus contained an animal, and
withhold a response otherwise. No indication was given
as to whether or not they should respond on masked
trials (we thus assumed that subjects would only respond
if they perceived an animal in spite of the mask—or by
mistake). In separate subsequent sessions, the subjects
were presented with the same ‘‘animal’’ and ‘‘distractor’’
images, always followed by a mask under the same
conditions as previously, and were asked to report their
subjective confidence in perceiving the contents of the
photographs (ranging from 0 if they had not perceived
anything besides the mask itself to 2 if they were certain
about some aspect, element, or object in the scene). For
most images (roughly 60%), the mask rendered the
scene perceptually invisible (Figure 2B). This was sup-
ported by the fact that further confidence judgments for
these images could not ( p > .15; see Methods) predict
categorization performance (Kunimoto, Miller, & Pash-
ler, 2001; Kolb & Braun, 1995). However, for all three
confidence levels (including ‘‘zero’’ confidence), catego-
rization performance was significantly above chance in
masked trials (t test, p < .0005) and almost 90% correct
for unmasked trials (Figure 2B).
Most importantly, the time at which subjects were
first able to discriminate between targets and distrac-
tors (i.e., generate selective behavioral responses) was
not different in the masked and unmasked conditions
(290 msec, x2 test on cumulative RT distributions, p < .05
for more than three consecutive time bins; Figure 2C).
This indicates that in both cases, the system must have
based its responses on information collected during the
first 26 msec of visual stimulation. Accordingly, the
responses to masked and unmasked targets significantly
differ after 300 msec poststimulus (x2 test on cumulative
RT distributions, p < .05 for more than three consecutive
time bins; average over three subjects), which indicates
that the influence of the mask is observed rapidly, but
not immediately (10 msec, i.e., one time bin) after
Figure 2. Natural scene categorization (animal vs. nonanimal) with
and without a mask (three subjects). (A) Schematic timeline of a
masked target trial. The natural scene, subtending roughly 108  68 of
visual angle, is presented for 26 msec, immediately followed by a strong
contrast mask presented for 80 msec. Subjects must respond as fast as
possible if the picture contains an animal. In a later task, subjects rate
their confidence in perceiving the contents of each masked scene.
(B) Proportion of trials associated with each possible confidence rating
(gray bars). Zero confidence (more than 50% of the trials) corresponds
to a situation where masking the scenes prevents visual awareness,
as indicated by the fact that further confidence judgments for these
images will fail to predict categorization accuracy. For all images
including those associated with zero confidence ratings, subjects can
perform the categorization task above chance (t test, p < .0005) under
conditions of backwards masking (gray line) and at almost 90% correct
in unmasked trials (black line). Error bars indicate standard error of
the mean. (C) Distribution of RTs to masked and unmasked scenes
(average for three subjects; 20-msec time bins). The values represent
the probability of the subjects responding to a particular trial type
(e.g., target or distractor, masked or unmasked) in each particular time
bin. Because we use a go/no-go paradigm, the sum over all time bins is
not necessarily equal to 1, but to the overall probability of responding
to this trial type. Therefore, responses to different trial types in each
time bin are directly comparable. RTs to targets significantly differ from
RTs to distractors (x2 test on cumulative RT distributions, p < .05 for
more than three consecutive time bins) at the same time in the masked
and unmasked condition (290 msec, marked ‘‘discrimination onset’’).
This suggests that in the general case of unmasked natural scenes, the
visual system must base its first responses on the information extracted
during the first 26 msec of stimulation.
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discrimination onset. In other words, the duration of
any potential ‘‘mandatory’’ loop in this task must be
extremely short, and in any case less than 20 msec. These
results constitute evidence for feed-forward-based pro-
cessing in a complex visual task.
Note however that the responses to masked targets
do not stop abruptly 26 msec (i.e., the SOA) after the
discrimination onset, as would be predicted by a
purely feed-forward model. The mask does not fully
erase the representation of previous stimuli (Keysers &
Perrett, 2002), which remains available to the system
until 500 msec poststimulus (last of three consecutive
significant time bins, x2 test between masked targets
and distractors, p < .05). This is 180 msec longer than
what would be observed in a purely feed-forward
architecture. It thus appears that the role of compu-
tational loops in natural scene categorization is not
a ‘‘mandatory’’ one (i.e., feed-forward processing is
indeed possible), but rather to allow the representa-
tion of a stimulus to ‘‘reverberate’’ in the visual system
for approximately 150–200 msec, even after it has
been replaced by a mask.
Our conclusions are potentially limited by two fac-
tors. First, using natural scenes makes it virtually
impossible to control for the distribution of local
contrasts in the stimulus and mask in any systematic
manner. In many regions of the scene, the contrast
might in fact be much lower than at the corresponding
locations in the mask, and vice versa. This implies that
stimulus and mask can potentially merge to form a
‘‘compound’’ stimulus (e.g., due to ganglion cells
integration times in the retina; Meister & Berry,
1999). The first 26 msec of the input signal to the
visual cortex would thus be ‘‘contaminated’’ by the
mask. This could explain why masked and unmasked
targets in our task differ only 10 msec after discrim-
ination onset (and not 26 msec as expected in a system
with absolutely no mandatory loops or minimal inte-
gration times). Second, we cannot easily relate the
present results to the subjects’ conscious perception
of the masked scenes, as we do not know (in partic-
ular, in cases where the subjects claim to be confident
about ‘‘some’’ property of the scene) what exactly was
perceived and at what point in time this occurred. In
order to compare feed-forward behavioral responses
with the actual subjects’ perception, we need to ensure
that all masked targets are consciously registered as
nontargets for the task. The following experiment, a
much simplified but better controlled version of the
rapid visual categorization task was designed to over-
come these shortcomings.
Discrimination of Masked Letters
In this task, the subjects had to respond as fast as
possible (and within 500 msec) to the letter P (target),
and ignore the letters R or B (distractors). Despite its
simplicity, the main advantage of this task over the
previous one was that both distractors ‘‘contained’’ the
target, and could thus also be used as masks (Figure 3A).
Letters were presented with unpredictable positions
(up to 2.58 of visual angle away from fixation) and sizes
(ranging from 0.68 to 1.28 of visual angle). In half of the
trials, the target (25% of trials) or the distractors (25% of
trials) were flashed for 52 msec, without a following
mask. In a certain number of trials (25%), however, the
target (P) was replaced after 26 msec by one of the
distractors (R or B, presented at the same size and
position for 26 msec) that effectively served as a mask
(backward-masked trials). Additionally, an equivalent
number of trials (25%) contained the same two stimuli
in reverse order: one distractor (R or B) followed by the
target (forward-masked trials).
In one session before and one session after they
performed this discrimination task, the subjects were
presented with many repetitions of these various stim-
ulus conditions and asked to report using the keyboard
what letter they had perceived. Both backward- and
forward-masked trials were invariably (more than 99%
of the time) reported as the component distractor
letter (i.e., R or B). The target (P) was thus effectively
masked, either backward or forward in time by the
distractors (R or B). Even when the subjects were
informed (in one final session at the end of the
experiment) that some of the stimuli contained a
succession of two different letters and given a chance
to report two letters instead of one, they were unable
to estimate above chance level the order of the two
letters ( Jaskowski, 1996; Neumann, Esselmann, &
Klotz, 1993): On any trial where they chose to report
two letters, their reports were not significantly different
(x2 test, p > .05) between the backward- and forward-
masked conditions.
For the purpose of the rapid discrimination task,
backward-masked, forward-masked, and distractor trials
were thus all consciously perceived as distractors. Yet in
a feed-forward system, backward-masked trials should
be interpreted as targets, at least for a certain period
after discrimination onset. Accordingly, in the rapid
discrimination task subjects responded significantly
more (paired t test, p < .001) to backward-masked
trials (23%) than distractors (14%) or forward-masked
trials (12%).
In fact, we found that the earliest selective motor
responses to unmasked and backward-masked targets
showed virtually identical distributions (Figure 3B).
After a period during which responses to all types of
stimuli were equally likely (‘‘undifferentiated responses,’’
i.e., anticipations), the subjects began to discriminate
targets and distractors above chance (discrimination
onset between targets and distractors: 303 msec; between
targets and forward-masked trials: 297 msec). However,
subjects still responded to targets and backward-masked
trials with the same probability for another 25 msec after
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this minimum discrimination time (i.e., until 322 msec
poststimulus; note that averages over 10 subjects are
reported here with 1-msec precision, while individual
subjects’ responses were analyzed using 10-msec time
bins). A similar result was obtained for an additional
subject who performed more than 42,000 trials (i.e.,
about 10 times as much as each of the other subjects;
Figure 3C). The discrimination time for this subject was
275 msec (for both the discrimination onset between
targets and distractors and between targets and forward-
masked trials), while the difference between targets and
backward-masked trials was only visible after 305 msec
(i.e., 30 msec later—here again, one should remember
that the temporal resolution of this analysis is not greater
than one time bin, i.e., 10 msec). Thus, for this subject as
well as the other 10, the second component letter started
modifying response distributions only around 25–30
msec after the onset of discrimination, as predicted by a
simple feed-forward model. In other words, the process-
ing time taken by any potential ‘‘mandatory’’ loops in this
task was essentially zero.
By contrast, forward-masked trials, although they
contained the same two component letters, presented
for the same duration as in backward-masked trials,
never triggered (i.e., in any of the 10-msec time bins
considered) significantly more behavioral responses than
distractors (average over all subjects, x2 test, p > .05).
The preceding results thus critically depend on the order
of presentation of the component letters.
As in the case of the natural scene categorization task,
we must note that the masking letter in backward-masked
trials did not fully overwrite the representation of the
target letter. In the present task, behavioral responses
to backward-masked trials were significantly higher
than responses to distractors until 415 msec poststi-
mulus (435 msec for the additional subject depicted
in Figure 3C). Again, this suggests that feedback path-
ways and loops in the visual system can allow the
representation of a masked stimulus to reverberate
for 100–130 msec. From the present data, it is not
possible to conclude whether this reverberation would
take place at a level prior or posterior to motor
decision stages (or potentially, both). In any case,
however, this result is more than surprising because
it implies that for nearly 150 msec after discrimination
onset, the system’s response is already selective, yet
Figure 3. By using letters as
stimuli we can ensure that
the contrast of the mask is
comparable to the contrast
of the stimulus. Under these
conditions, a feed-forward
model predicts that fine
temporal differences between
stimulus and mask onset
should be preserved up to the
highest levels of the processing
hierarchy, and observed in
motor responses as well.
(A) Subjects are required to
respond as fast as possible
when the letter P is presented
and withhold responding when
the letters R or B are displayed
(examples are shown here only
with the distractor letter R).
The letters’ location and size
are randomized for each trial.
In half of the trials, letters are
flashed for 52 msec, while in
the other half, two distinct
letters are flashed successively
for 26 msec (the target followed
by a distractor in backward-
masked trials, a distractor
followed by the target in
forward-masked trials). Under these conditions, due to backward and forward masking effects, only the distractor letter is consciously perceived.
(B) Average distribution of RTs for 10 subjects (10-msec time bins). As predicted by the feed-forward model, responses to backward-masked
trials follow the distribution of responses to targets for a certain period after the discrimination onset (290 msec). During this period, which lasts
approximately 25 msec, behavioral responses are only determined by the first 26 msec of stimulation. After this period, the masking letter begins to
affect responses, but it is only after more than 415 msec that RTs will fully reflect the subject’s perception of the stimulation. (C) Individual data for
one additional subject (an author) who performed more than 42,000 trials. This subject had relatively short RTs (median 355 vs. 375 msec for
the other 10 subjects). The similar onset of RTs distributions for target and backward-masked trials, which was smeared by the averaging process in
the previous panel, is particularly apparent here. The discrimination onset for this subject was 275 msec, and the difference between targets and
backward-masked trials appeared after 305 msec (i.e., 30 msec later). Backward-masked trials went down to the level of distractors after 435 msec.
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can be incompatible with the subject’s (subsequent)
conscious perception of the stimulation.
The picture that emerges from these results is that of
a feed-forward architecture in which information about
the first milliseconds of visual stimulation can propagate
throughout the visual system, unaffected by later
changes, and can determine the earliest behavioral
responses even when this information is not (because
of backward masking) or not yet (in the more general
case) available to consciousness. Although only a small
proportion of responses will be determined solely on
the basis of this feed-forward sweep (no more than 5%
on average in the present experimental conditions), its
effects will continue to have strong repercussions on
later behavioral responses for a significant period, due to
the reverberatory action of feedback loops.
DISCUSSION
The short selective neuronal latencies observed in elec-
trophysiological recordings of monkey inferotemporal
neurons (i.e., 80– 100 msec; Perrett, Rolls, & Caan,
1982; Bruce, Desimone, & Gross, 1981) and the equiv-
alently short decision-related waves observed in event-
related potentials during complex visual categorization
tasks in humans (as low as 150 msec; VanRullen &
Thorpe, 2001a; Thorpe et al., 1996) point to the idea that
visual processing in the ventral visual pathway is some-
times so fast that it could be carried out in a feed-forward
manner (Thorpe & Fabre-Thorpe, 2001; Rolls & Tovee,
1994; Thorpe & Imbert, 1989). Here, using backward
masking of natural scenes or letter stimuli, we show that
selective feed-forward processing is indeed possible for
complex visual tasks. Let us insist again that the present
results go beyond the simple demonstration that masked
and potentially unseen stimuli are somehow registered
by the visual system (e.g., Thompson & Schall, 1999;
Kovacs et al., 1995; Rolls & Tovee, 1994) and able to
influence behavioral decisions (e.g., Keysers et al., 2001;
Thompson & Schall, 1999; Dehaene et al., 1998; Neu-
mann & Klotz, 1994) or affect subsequent percepts in
rather unexpected ways (e.g., ‘‘feature inheritance’’;
Herzog & Koch, 2001). By analyzing the time course of
motor responses and showing that for a short period,
selective behavioral responses are entirely determined by
the first few tens of milliseconds of stimulation (i.e., are
not affected by subsequent changes of the visual stim-
ulation such as backward masking), these results allow us
to quantify the extent of ‘‘mandatory’’ computational
loops in the visual system: Under conditions where the
local contrast of stimulus and mask is carefully controlled,
the time taken by such loops essentially amounts to zero.
It could be argued that psychophysical measurements
of RTs do not generally constitute the most direct
reflection of the underlying neuronal processes. Yet this
simple approach allows us here to reveal a direct link
between the time course of the visual stimulation and
the time course of behavioral responses, the ‘‘ultimate’’
output of the visual system; thus, it is not unreasonable
to generalize this correspondence between the sys-
tem’s input and output to intermediate stages of visual
analysis, recognition, and motor decisions processes.
On the other hand, our psychophysical approach is
necessarily limited in its temporal resolution: For the
statistical tests reported here, this resolution is of one
time bin (i.e., 10 msec). Averaging over a number of
individual subjects clearly makes our conclusions more
reliable, but does not necessarily enhance the temporal
resolution. For this reason, we cannot reject here the
possibility of more ‘‘local’’ feedback loops, within or
among layers of a particular cortical area, that could
take place in only a few milliseconds. Our conclusions
that selective visual processing can occur without
‘‘mandatory’’ feedback loops is nevertheless valid in
the context of more ‘‘global’’ feedback iterations, last-
ing on the order of 10 msec or more.
Of course, whether or not computational loops can be
defined as ‘‘mandatory’’ depends on the particular
function investigated and on what we regard as the
visual system’s output: Here, we show that a feed-
forward pass can be sufficient in the case of rapid visual
categorization, but the performance of other functions
involving the same stimuli (in particular, higher cogni-
tive functions such as visual awareness) might explicitly
require feedback processing loops (Bullier, 2001;
Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) or long integration periods
(Subramaniam, Biederman, & Madigan, 2000; Libet,
1973). Indeed, a recent study by Super, Spekreijse, and
Lamme (2001) indicates that the first wave of feed-
forward neural activity propagating through the visual
system is not sufficient to underlie visual awareness:
Failures of stimulus detection are mostly independent of
this feed-forward activity, but associated with the ab-
sence of a late component of the neural response
(appearing after 100 msec in primary visual cortex),
believed to rely on recurrent feedback processing.
The long period of reverberatory activity (approx-
imately 150 msec) observed immediately after the
feed-forward sweep in our results could correspond
to this ‘‘second’’ component of the visual response,
during which feed-forward and feedback signals are
gradually matched, compared, or combined (Keysers &
Perrett, 2002). Only the outcome of such computations
would eventually gain access to visual awareness, thus
explaining why a masked stimulus (e.g., a backward-
masked letter) can reverberate in the system for around
150 msec without inducing a subsequent conscious
percept. In this sense, such reverberatory activity could
be thought of as a sort of ‘‘iconic memory’’ (Coltheart,
1980; Di Lollo, 1977; Sperling, 1960), allowing stimulus
representations to remain in the visual system after the
corresponding objects have disappeared from the retina,
but rapidly fading in the absence of supporting bottom-
up or top-down signals.
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METHODS
The subjects were seated in a dark room, 120 cm away
from a computer screen connected to an SGI (O2)
workstation. The monitor refresh rate was 75 Hz, allow-
ing stimuli to be displayed with a frame duration of
about 13 msec.
Categorization of Masked Natural Scenes
Three subjects, including one author, participated in this
experiment. Animal and distractor images were similar
to those used and described in previous experiments
(e.g., VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001a, 2001b).
The categorization task was performed in three sep-
arate 1-hr sessions, during which one-third of all images
were masked. These were randomized and ‘‘rotated’’
across sessions, so that by the end of the experiment
each image had been seen only once with a mask and
twice without. A session contained 1536 trials (distinct
images, half of which were animals and half were
distractors) distributed in 96-trial blocks. Eight different
masks (all constructed in a similar manner: A combina-
tion of white noise at different spatial frequencies on
which a colored naturalistic texture was superimposed)
were used and chosen randomly for each trial. The
image and mask subtended roughly 108  68 of visual
angle. Subjects were asked to hold down the mouse
button to run the sequence of trials and to respond as
fast as possible by releasing the mouse button when an
animal was presented.
In two subsequent sessions, the subjects were pre-
sented with the same 1536 images always followed
by a mask and were asked to report their subjective
confidence (0: ‘‘I saw nothing but the mask’’; 1: ‘‘I saw
something even though I do not know what it was’’;
2: ‘‘I could identify at least one property or object in
the scene’’). For the analyses dependent on particular
confidence levels, we rejected images that had been
reported with opposite confidence levels (i.e., 0 and 2)
by any two of the three subjects. Note that we did not
reject images that had been reported with opposite
confidence levels by the same subject. To assess the
subjects’ awareness during trials associated with zero
confidence, we investigated whether further confi-
dence judgments for these trials would be able to
predict categorization performance (Kolb & Braun,
1995). As proposed by Kunimoto et al. (2001), we
calculated the d0 for awareness:
d0 ¼ zð pðhigh confidence j correctÞÞ
zð pðhigh confidence j incorrectÞÞ
where z is the inverse cumulative function of the normal
distribution and ‘‘correct’’ or ‘‘incorrect’’ refers to the
subject’s performance on this particular masked image
during the categorization task. A t test on the obtained
d0 values showed that they were not different from
zero, both when the calculation was made according to
the boundary between ‘‘zero’’ and ‘‘higher’’ confidence
( p > .15) and when it was made according to the
boundary between ‘‘full’’ (i.e., Level 2) and ‘‘lower’’
confidence ( p > .2). The same result was obtained
using a (much simpler) x2 test: Further confidence
ratings (within the group of images already associated
with zero confidence) were not correlated with
categorization performance (df = 2, p > .05).
The statistical tests used for comparing RTs distribu-
tions are briefly described in the main text. The time at
which two conditions significantly differ and not differ is
defined as the first and last, respectively, of three con-
secutive significant time bins using a x2 test ( p < .05) on
the cumulative and noncumulative RT distributions,
respectively ( VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001b).
Discrimination of Masked Letters
Ten naı¨ve subjects participated in this experiment. One
additional subject, an author, performed roughly 10
times as many trials as each of the other subjects, and
his results are therefore analyzed and presented sepa-
rately. The experiment was performed in three 1-hr
sessions, each containing approximately 18 blocks of
96 trials.
In one block at the beginning of the first session and
one block around the end of the last session, the
subjects were asked to report the letters that they
perceived using the keyboard. Two of the 10 subjects
applied instructions from another part of the experi-
ment and performed this task in a speeded fashion.
Their data were discarded before analysis.
In six separate blocks at the end of the last session,
the subjects were informed that some of the stimuli
actually contained a rapid succession of two letters and
given a chance to report two letters (potentially the
same) instead of one. One subject was discarded from
the analysis after she reported that she could use the
retinal fading of the second stimulus to estimate
temporal order above chance level. Responses were
pooled for other subjects and a x2 test ( p < .05)
compared the distributions of ‘‘nontrivial’’ responses
(i.e., reports with more than one component letter) in
backward- and forward-masked trials. No significant
difference was observed.
In the remaining blocks, subjects performed the
rapid discrimination task. They were asked to hold
down the mouse button to run the sequence of trials
and to respond as fast as possible by releasing the
mouse button when the letter P, but not the letter R
or B, was presented. The speeded response was
enforced by auditory feedback, given only for target
trials where the subject either did not respond or
responded too slow (cutoff RT determined by the
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experimenter, in general between 350 and 500 msec
depending on the subjects).
The time at which two conditions significantly differ
and not differ is defined as the first time bin and the
time bin immediately before the first time bin, respec-
tively, at which significance is reached and persists for all
subsequent time bins, using a x2 test ( p < .05) on,
respectively, the cumulative RT distributions and ‘‘back-
ward’’ cumulative RT distributions (i.e., a cumulative
distribution starting with the last time bin and summing
over bins backward in time). These discrimination onset
and offset times were calculated separately for each
subject. For the time at which targets differ from for-
ward-masked trials, three subjects were discarded from
the analysis because the obtained discrimination onset
was not plausible (i.e., less than 160 msec). Discrim-
ination times in different conditions (e.g., ‘‘target vs.
distractor’’ and ‘‘target vs. backward-masked trials’’)
were compared using a paired t test over the values
obtained for all subjects.
For the additional subject depicted in Figure 3C, the
number of trials was large enough to use the same
statistical tests as previously, but using the distributions
of RTs instead of their cumulative distributions. The
results obtained with this method were comparable.
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